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INTRODUCTION
In February 1996, a group of four Central and South American ba-
nana exporting countries, together with the United States, requested
consultations with the European Community (EC) over a 1993 EC regu-
lation for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas.' The
complainants estimated they were losing $147 million annually because of
the regulation, which gives preferential access in the EC market to ba-
* S.J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., University of Michigan
(1997); LL.B., University of Ottawa (1992). The writer would like to thank Professor John
Jackson of the University of Michigan Law School for his comments and generosity in the
preparation of this article. A version of this article was originally submitted in fulfillment of
requirements for Professor Jackson's seminar in International Economic Law and Policy in Fall
1996. It was during a session of that seminar that a guest lecturer, Professor Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann of the University of Geneva, remarked that third parties under GATT had been
examined little, an observation which inspired this article. The writer also gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Maurits Lugard, now of the Legal Service, European Commission,
Brussels, in locating materials and sharing his thoughts on the GATT" Bananas Trilogy.
1. 1993 O.J. (L47) 1.
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nanas grown in Lom6 Convention countries.2 The parties were unable
reach an agreement, and three months later the World Trade Organiza-
tion's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body formed a panel to resolve the
complaint
Thereafter, a number of African, Caribbean and Pacific banana-
producing countries (ACP countries) that benefit from the EC regulation
were allowed to participate in a session of the panel proceedings under the
newly created status of "observer." The panel justified its decision to
permit so many observers on the basis of the "very large" effect the EC
banana regime has on their economies. To allay fears that widespread
intervention would complicate the proceedings, the panel took care to
limit the observers' participation. They were only allowed to make brief
oral arguments and were not expected to provide written submissions
beyond answers to questions posed by the panel.' The panel sessions
occurred as scheduled, although the panel chairman has since indicated
that the panel's report will be delayed due, in part, to the large number of
countries involved in the case.6 Delay was a reason why at least one party,
the United States, had initially objected to the observers' participation.7
GATT decisionmaking has long had a multipartite aspect, but rarely
have so many countries actively intervened in one case. It now appears
that Bananas III will be seen as a model of how WTO adjudication in-
tends to treat the difficult issue of multilateral dispute settlement, in
addition to resolving complex points of law and fact. The case merits
2. See Brent Borrell, Banana Policy Gone Mad, J. COMMERCE, Aug. 7, 1996, at A7. The
Lomd Convention is a collective cooperation agreement between the fifteen EC countries and
seventy developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Its main features are EC
financial aid for these developing countries, including aid in the form of preferential access to
the EC for certain developing country products including bananas. The most recent version of
the Convention, Lomd IV, also urges respect for human rights. See Douglas E. Matthews, Lomd
IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Decade, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
3. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/DS27, May 22, 1997 [hereinafter Bananas III] [the World Trade Organization and
Dispute Settlement Body are hereinafter referred to as "WTO" and "DSB," respectively]. The
complainants in Bananas III, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States,
alleged that the EC's regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas was inconsis-
tent with GAIT Articles I, II, III, X, XI, XIII as well as provisions of the Import Licencing
Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS.
4. Canada and Japan were also allowed to intervene under the more traditional status of
third party, presumably because their interest was seen as being with the complainants. See infra
note 55.
5. See WTO Banana Panel Allows Enhanced Role for ACP Other Third Parties, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 20, 1996, at 15.
6. See U.S. WTO Challenges of EU Hormone Ban, Bananas Policy Delayed, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 10, 1997, at 2.
7. See id.
[Vol. 18:615
Of Substantial Interest
attention because its issues and arguments reflect the exceptionally wide
range of trade-related interests covered by GATT 1994.8 These interests-
and the countries raising them-compete with each other for priority. In a
very real sense, how well these interests are reconciled in Bananas III will
be a measure of the new GAT"s success.
This article's examination of the status of third parties under GATT is
important for several reasons, one of which is the proliferation of third
party participation as demonstrated by Bananas III. A second reason for
its importance is that there has been little written about third parties under
GATr.9 This neglect stands in sharp contrast to ample literature on the
related subject of greater public participation in the WTO.' ° The oversight
could be a function of GATT dispute resolution, which did not always
enjoy the level of public attention it garners today. Until recently the
GAT system handled no more than about a dozen disputes a year." Many
countries were often content to ignore GAT' dispute resolution, either
because the system itself was poorly understood or because GATr was
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15 1994 LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
9. The writer has not found any monograph on the subject. Standard sources discuss third
parties, but only in passing. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]; JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM], ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990); EDMOND McGOVERN, INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (1982). Furthermore, a possible deficiency of this paper is the
fact that in its writing there were only panel reports, limited historical material, and a few books
and articles to rely upon. These sources may not tell the whole story, particularly on a procedure
driven subject like intervention. A vital part of the tale may be embodied in practice known only
to those who participate in GATT proceedings. This possibility may make the conclusion
reached here fall somewhat wide of its mark.
10. NGO participation in the WTO is contentious because, strictly speaking, it is not pro-
vided for under the GATT 1994. But intervention by member countries is. Intervention therefore
enjoys a legitimacy and immediacy which NGO involvement does not, although the debate about
NGO involvement may influence how third interests, including those now asserted by WTO
member countries, will be treated in future GATT dispute resolution. For literature on the subject
of NGO involvement see Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996); Phillip M. Nichols,
Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); Daniel Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs
Environmental NGOs (Nov. 9, 1996) (unpublished paper on file with the author).
11. Debra Steger, General Counsel to the WTO Appellate Body, estimated that the GATT
workload averaged about three formal complaints per year during the 1970s and eleven com-
plaints per year during the 1980s. See WTO: Sharp Increase Seen in WTO Disputes Including
Many from Developing Countries, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY (Oct. 18, 1996).
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perceived as irrelevant to national development. That attitude has now
changed. The WTO faces increased litigation as countries request panels
and seek to intervene in large numbers, 2 and a review of third party
practice is therefore appropriate to better understand this form of partici-
pation.
A study of third parties under GATT should also help to better com-
prehend standing under GATT generally. The issue of standing was
squarely raised in Bananas Ill 3 The panel report will yield important
clues as to how standing is to be dealt with in future WTO dispute resolu-
tion.
The thesis of this paper is that, while it may be useful to guard against
abuse of third party status, what is happening now should be happening.
The willingness of the Bananas III panel to deal with a spectrum of
representative interests is fully consistent with GATIT's history and man-
date. This thesis is supported by an examination of GATT instruments and
panel reports involving third parties. Both reveal that third party participa-
tion in GAT'T proceedings was designed to be, and has been, profound,
vigorous and sustained. They repudiate the notion that GATT dispute
resolution is ill-equipped to accommodate active intervention. GATT
panels are not courts. Although panels and courts exhibit some features in
common, it is important to avoid comparing GAIT adjudication with
municipal courts, where intervention is often restricted in deference to the
two-party paradigm, because GATI' adjudication has been entrusted with
reconciling a range of interdependent concerns and must remain faithful to
this purpose.
Part I of this article examines the traditional position of third parties in
international law and their status as originally conceived in GATT. The
General Agreement established a system of consensual adjudication and a
hierarchy of interests in which third parties required a "substantial inter-
est" to intervene in dispute resolution. The definition of "substantial
interest" was qualified in some provisions, but never qualified for the
purpose of the General Agreement as a whole and only rarely specified in
practice. This ambiguity, together with the flexibility of GATT procedure,
12. Id.
13. The United States has assumed standing, among other arguments, on the basis that a
U.S.-owned multinational company, Chiquita Brands International, is restricted in marketing
bananas, a service covered by the General Agreement on Services (GATS). The EC tried to
exclude the U.S. from the panel proceedings because the U.S. does not trade in bananas with the
EC and because services covered under the GATS are distinct marketable products and not
services incorporated as value-added in goods sold on the market. See U.S. Submission to
Banana Panel Offers Expansive Services Link, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 19, 1996, at 15;
European Union Presses to Exclude U.S. from WTO Banana Panel, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug.
16, 1996, at 3.
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meant that the term "substantial interest" served as no standard at all.
Instead, panels developed restrictions on intervention that were more
substantive than procedural, such as the rule precluding the raising of new
issues by third parties. The panel reports also identify group representation
as a feature of third party practice under GATT, which could allow re-
stricted intervention in the form of consolidated representation.
Part II of this article focuses on changes to third party status brought
about by the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO
Agreement elaborates upon third party procedure but does not change its
liberal character. Rather than criticize the continuing lack of precision, this
article argues that the operative sections of the new Agreement, in par-
ticular the Dispute Settlement Understanding, (DSU) must be interpreted
to be consistent with past practice in order to reconcile the ever widening
concerns of the WTO's mandate. This interpretive method is particularly
important as WTO dispute resolution becomes ever more multilateral.
Because there is always potential for overuse or abuse of third party
status under GAT, however, Part III recognizes a need to limit interven-
tion where necessary and surveys the law of intervention in two other
adjudicative bodies, the International and European Courts of Justice.
Each has developed an effective method of restricting intervener partici-
pation by relying, to some degree, on the tribunal's purpose, and these
methods suggest limitations for the WTO system. Part IV concludes that
while multiple third parties may tax WTO dispute resolution, precedent
demonstrates that they do so minimally and that active intervention is
therefore not a threat to the integrity of the system, but rather is a means
of informed decisionmaking.1
4
14. Before beginning the substantive discussion, two observations should be made. First, in
most systems of law, the concept of intervention is broader than that of third party practice.
There are, in fact, several forms of participation in legal proceedings that fall under the general
rubric of "intervention," including amicus curiae. However, the term "intervention" and "third
party" are used interchangeably here, mainly to avoid repetitive usage of key terms.
Second, an important part of the research presented in this article is based on unadopted
GATT panel reports, which may not accord with the purist's view that only adopted panel
reports are legitimate and worthy of reliance. The view taken here is that adoption of panel
reports by the GAT'T Council in the past was rarely related or predicated upon the procedure
used. Therefore, adoption or non-adoption is not an indicator of the legitimacy of third party
practice. This position is borne out by the consistency of third party procedure in both adopted and
unadopted reports, as well as by recent statements of the WTO Appellate Body. See infra note 139.
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I. THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A. Third Parties in International Law
A third party is defined in international law as a "state not party to a
treaty."'5 The traditional pacta tertiis rule 6 holds that treaties only bind
consenting States, leaving a non-party unaffected. This rule, reflecting
international law's emphasis on consent and bilateralism, for the most
part, continues to apply today.17
Within multilateral treaties, however, the concept of a third party is
somewhat different. On accession to a treaty, a signatory consents to be
bound by the treaty regime, but also receives certain benefits in exchange.
One such benefit is a heightened interest in the process of resolving
differences under the treaty.' A dispute over the scope of treaty require-
ments between to signatories can affect not only the disputants, but also
can impact other treaty signatories, either as a direct consequence of the
dispute or through the interpretation of a treaty right or obligation. Thus,
treaty membership eases the concern common to all adjudication that third
party participation may be too speculative.
The point made in the preceeding paragraph suggests that all multilat-
eral treaties change bilateral relationships. Another reason for this
"multilateralizing influence," mentioned by Chinkin is the steady expan-
sion of international regulation into areas not previously thought to be
within the realm of international jurisdiction.' 9 As multilateral treaties
proliferate, so too do their memberships. It seems more reasonable to take
15. JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 434 (1992);
CLIVE PARRY & JOHN P. GRANT, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 395
(1986).
16. The maxim "pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt" is said to mean that a treaty binds
consenting parties only, and strangers to a treaty are legally unaffected by it. A modem restate-
ment of the rule appears in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 693 (1969), which provides that "a treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third [s]tate without its consent:'
17. Brownlie notes that there are two modem exceptions to the "pacta tertiis" rule. One
arises where a norm embodied in a treaty become part of international custom. The second arises
where a treaty confers rights on third parties, such as treaties involving major international
waterways. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622-24 (4th ed.
1990).
18. See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1993). Chinkin
discusses this position with reference to Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153 (1946), where "the required nexus between the intervener
and the parties is supplied by the common membership of the relevant treaty." For more general
commentary on the effect of treaties on third parties, see OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
1261 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
19. CHINKIN, supra note 18, at 25-27.
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account of all relevant concerns, be they within or outside a particular
bilateral context, in order to best achieve a treaty's purpose.
Nevertheless, there comes a point when intervention can tax the treaty
system and threaten its ability to make decisions. There may also be
situations where intervention is sought for frivolous or vexatious ends, or
for other reasons completely divorced from the dispute itself. Because of
these possibilities, it is important to develop means to limit intervention. A
problem in international law is that these means of limitation are not
readily apparent. In part, this may be due to the continuing notion of
sovereign equality. Simply put, limiting participation is difficult when all
participants are presumptively equal. But it is also true that procedures for
effective multilateral adjudication are not well developed in international
law because complex multipartite disputes have been rare and because
international decisionmaking has not had to face the pressure of inconsis-
tent obligations, judicial economy, and the promotion of the efficient
administration of justice present in municipal legal systems.20
Trying to limit third party intervention in the international trade con-
text raises particularly hard questions. Not only are the challenges of
sovereign equality and inexperience present, but because international
trade is inherently about economic interdependence, this factor raises an
added concern. Any change in the terms of trade is seen as affecting the
entire global economy, not just the parties to a dispute. There is great
built-in pressure to permit intervention.
In attempting to develop some method of limitation under GAT, it is
therefore important to determine what is required to intervene. This
exercise will identify current limits to third party participation and suggest
what the possibilities might be. The central question is, what level of
interest is necessary to intervene? This inquiry can be divided into two
categories: one category focuses on the type of interest, the other on the
degree of interest. Regarding the type of interest, is third party standing
based on a domestic interest alone? Can a "secondary" interest qualify,
that is, can a party intervene because its nationals provide secondary
factors, such as shipping, insurance or banking, that might be impaired by
a change in the terms of trade of the product in issue? Can a WTO Mem-
ber assume the interest of another Member, or even a non-Member, in a
sort of representative or "derivative" capacity? Can the WTO itself inter-
vene? Is a third party bound to support the arguments of one side, or can it
act in the manner of amicus curiae, advocating different arguments to
arrive at one party's conclusion, or even at a different conclusion? Can the
20. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Multilateral Disputes, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 376 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).
Summner 19971
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interest asserted be that of an exporter or an importer? Regarding the
degree of interest, is a direct legal interest always necessary, or is an
abstract one in the progressive interpretation of GAT' sufficient? Can a
Member's failure to participate in a panel hearing be used against it, either
in the case at hand or in another case involving a similar issue? To try to
answer these questions, it is useful to examine the history of GATI'.
B. Third Parties under GATT
GATT is an international treaty aimed at limiting tariffs, controlling
the use of non-tariff barriers, and eliminating discriminatory treatment in
international commerce. GATT's main substantive feature is the Most
Favored Nation Clause (MFN Clause), which requires a series of negoti-
ated tariff reductions between GAT member countries." Pursuant to the
MFN clause, the benefits of tariff reduction extended by one GATT
signatory to another are generally extended to all signatories. The con-
verse of the MFN arrangement is that if obligations are suspended
between two signatories, then in theory they should be suspended to all
signatories as well.2 This possibility recalls the earlier discussion about
third party standing under multilateral treaties and demonstrates how
MFN treatment can potentially intensify the "downside" of treaty obliga-
tions because all signatories face potential injury when a country is
retaliated against. This injury may include loss of market share in the
retaliating country or the disruption of trade flows to other countries when
the country retaliated against redirects its trade.
An adverse impact on global commerce is not the only consequence
of the failure of MFN. If the disputing countries decide to take the matter
before a GAT panel, all Members run the risk of a textual interpretation
unfavorable to at least some national interests. Domestic political pressure
to "do something" may also build, particularly if GATT is perceived as the
source of domestic problems.
A second feature of GATT is its dispute settlement system, which has
evolved over time from a multilateral process involving many parties to a
more bilateral process generally involving fewer ones. Modem GATT
21. GATT 1994, supra note 8, art. I(1). There are a number of important derogations to the
MFN concept within GATT, but these do not detract from GATT's essential goals.
22. The issue of selectivity in the application of escape clause remedies "has been among
the most controversial aspects of safeguard policy." The only panel report to address the issue,
Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products, GATT B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) 119,
125-126 (1981), held that quantitative restrictions should be imposed in an MFN-consistent
manner. The Uruguay Round was only partly successful in resolving the issue. GAIT 1994 is
silent on the question whether Article XIX, the Safeguards Clause, requires MFN application
generally, but the Agreement on Safeguards permits quantitative restrictions to counter import
surges. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 651-52.
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dispute settlement is characterized by a highly adversarial bilateralism
reminiscent of litigation in a municipal court, but retains significant
multilateral features. This curious dualism favors small countries and it is
therefore attractive for all countries to intervene for many reasons, in-
cluding the genuine fear that a panel report may affect them.23
It is not clear if the pro-intervention bias of MFN or the GATT dispute
settlement system was perceived in the first attempt to create an interna-
tional trade law regime following World War II. The Havana Charter of
194824 envisaged liberal participation by non-governmental organizations
in activities of the projected International Trade Organization. 1 There was,
however, no equivalent vision or formal mechanism for third party status
in this arrangement. Chapter VmI of the Havana Charter, entitled
"Settlement of Differences," provided that a member country could make
a written representation "to such other Member or Members as it consid-
ers to be concerned" in commencing a formal trade dispute.26 This
language placed the burden on the complainant to identify which parties
were respondents or affected by the measure in dispute. After consulta-
tions failed, the concerned Members could submit the matter to
arbitration, the result of which was binding only on participants in the
dispute.
The Charter also allowed a dispute to be referred to an eighteen-
member executive board.27 The board was authorized to resolve the matter
by various means, including releasing "the Member or Members affected
from obligations or the grant of concessions. '28 Similar language was used
to provide for further review by the conference, the ITO's plenary body.29
Article 96 of the Charter permitted any Member whose interests were
23. It is conceivable, for example, that a GATT Member could threaten to intervene as a
third party in order to unnecessarily complicate proceedings, hoping thereby to extract a
concession from one of the parties. In GATT 1994, Members have undertaken not to do this. See
GATI 1994, supra note 8, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 3(10). This undertaking does not mean that Members have not on occasion used
third party status for apparently prospective or ulterior purposes in the past, however. See Part
I.B. supra.
24. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.S. Department of State
Publication 3206 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
25. This point has been made by Charnovitz, supra note 10, at 338-39. Charnovitz states
that "[t]he fact that the negotiators of the ITO treaty provided for NGO participation, combined
with evidence that the Interim ITO was prepared to implement this provision, together demon-
strate that NG0 participation is consistent with the design and aspirations of the multilateral
trading system" He refers to Havana Charter Article 87(2) and to proposed procedures for NGO
involvement prepared by the forerunner of the GAIT Secretariat in May 1949.
26. Havana Charter supra note 24, art. 93(1) (emphasis added).
27. Id art. 94(1).
28. Id art. 94(3) (emphasis added).
29. Id art. 95(3).
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prejudiced by a Conference decision to seek an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice. The request for an opinion was to be ac-
companied by a question furnished "after consultation with the Members
substantially interested."30
The striking ambiguity of the Havana Charter made it of little assis-
tance in defining the conditions under which Members could be third
parties. In this respect the lack of an explicit intervention provision was a
key oversight. In addition, the complainant's burden of determining
interested third parties presumed that the complainant would have all the
relevant information to make this determination. Even in ideal circum-
stances this is a questionable assumption. The Charter's language also
permitted appeal to the ICJ-a poor choice given the expertise and effi-
ciency of the Court. In sum, third party status seems not to have been
carefully conceived by the drafters of the Havana Charter. One possible
explanation for the Charter's textual vagueness could be the consensual
nature of the postwar trade structure regime. On such a theory, there was
no need for well-defined third party status because Members could have
reasonably assumed that they would be consulted in decisions affecting
their interests.
The ambiguity and failure of the Havana Charter are to be contrasted
with the clarity and success of the General Agreement, concluded in
October 1947.' Due to the Members' deliberate preference for informal-
ity, the General Agreement did not spell out any formal system of conflict
resolution. Over time, however, a system of "working parties" came into
being to examine particular disputes over the interpretation of GA'TT.
Third parties were a prominent feature of this model as the typical work-
ing party included representatives of the principals, one or two countries
supporting either side, and some neutrals. Although the neutrals gave
advice and their concurrence in the final decision was important, the true
aim of a working party was agreement among the principals. Neverthe-
less, third parties played an important role in helping to generate a
consensus that became the basis for many decisions .
30. Id. art. 96(3).
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194. The Havana Charter, creating an International Trade Organization, never came
into force because of the failure of the United States Congress to approve it. For a discussion of
this point see JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 32-34.
32. Hudec states that the performance of the Brazilian Taxes Working Party of April 1949
was typical of this model. The members of the working party were the principals (Brazil and
France), two countries which had supported France's complaint (the United States and the
United Kingdom), and three neutral developing countries (China, Cuba, and India). See HUDEC,
supra note 9, at 78-79.
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In October 1952, the working party model was tentatively superseded
by a panel system, which was seen as more objective and as "satisfying
the legal instincts of the GATT administrators."33 GATI' dispute resolution
became more judicialized. Parties were afforded an opportunity to present
their case before a panel, which would also hear from any other interested
party. The panel would then draft a report, submit an interim version for
the parties' consideration, and eventually make recommendations to the
collective GATT membership, which had the final authority over disposi-
tion of the case.4
In the evolution from working parties to panels, the role of third par-
ties changed. Third parties went from being presumptive equals offering
suggestions for the collective good to being parties with their own separate
status and distinct interests at stake. A small, but telling, sign of this
change was a decision by the GATT Council in 1958 to regulate proce-
dures under which a complainant was required to inform the GATT
Director-General about consultations under Article XXII. The decision
directed that notice of consultations be given to all Members in case they
wanted to join." Notice would not have been necessary had non-parties,
including interveners, still been considered inherent participants in the
dispute resolution process.
The text of the General Agreement may have contributed to the proc-
ess of individualization of non-parties by identifying specific interests that
parties could assert. A hierarchy was established, beginning with a
"principal supplying interest," followed by a "substantial interest," and
ending with what might be called simply an "interest." GATT Article
XXVIII made clear that a "principal supplying interest" is to be distin-
guished from a "substantial interest." In referring to parties with a
"principal supplying interest," Article XXVIII:I spoke of "negotiations
and agreement" with a Contracting Party wanting to modify or withdraw a
tariff concession. In referring to parties with a "substantial interest," the
same clause spoke only of a duty to consult. Article 4 of the Interpretive
Note to Article XXVIII indicated that it would not normally be appropri-
ate for the Contracting Parties to determine that more than one
Contracting Party had a "principal supplying interest." The implication of
these provisions is evident. A "principal supplying interest" was consid-
ered to have more at stake than a "substantial interest," and while there
might be only one "principal supplying interest" there could be many
more "substantial interests." From this distinction, it is possible to con-
clude that a "principal supplying interest" would be entitled to invoke
33. Id.
34. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 9, at 176.
35. Id. at 175.
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GATT dispute resolution, whereas a "substantial interest" would have a
lesser right, conceivably the right to intervene.
The General Agreement also elaborated on the term "substantial in-
terest," which was tied to a specific trade interest36 as it had often been
under the Havana Charter.1 Yet, the repetition and varied usage occurring
in the General Agreement made the term clearer. The term's most com-
prehensive definition occurred in Section 7 of the Interpretive Note to
Article XXVIII. This reads:
the expression "substantial interest" is not capable of a precise
definition and accordingly may present difficulties for the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. It is, however, intended to be con-
strued to cover only those contracting parties which have, or in
the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions affecting
their exports could reasonably be expected to have, a significant
share in the market of the contracting party seeking to modify or
withdraw the concession.
The Note suggests that the drafters originally conceived "substantial
interest" as being trade-linked, but much of the term's definition remained
unclear. For example, was a "substantial interest" to be objectively or
subjectively determined? Article XXVIII explicitly states that "substantial
interest" was to be "determined by the Contracting Parties," but this is not
true for other provisions mentioning a "substantial interest."'38 Often there
36. "Substantial interest" appears in the GATT as follows: "all other contracting parties
having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned," "a substantial interest in
supplying the product shares," "any other contracting party having a substantial interest in
supplying that product" (Art. XIII); "substantial interest as exporters of the product" (Art. XIX);
"a substantial interest in the product concerned" (Art. XXVII); "subject to consultation with any
other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest
in such concession" (Art. XXVIII). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (entry into force Jan. 1, 1948).
37. The term appears in the Havana Charter as follows: "to Members having a substantial
interest in supplying that product" (Art. 20(2)(b)); "all other Members having a substantial
interest in supplying the product concerned" (Art. 22(2)(d)); "shall allot to Member countries
having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares" (ibid.); "a substantial interest in
supplying that product" (Art. 22(4)); "the request of any other Member or Members having a
substantial interest in trade with it in the product concerned" (Art. 31(1)); "those Members
having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned" (Art. 40(2)).
38. Thus, for example, in Article XIII:2(d) substantial interest is determined by supply of
product shares, presumably based on information agreed to by the parties. Similarly, under
Article XIX:2 the determination appears to be left to the country concerned. It is interesting to
observe that, at least in some instances, this subjectivity has been moderated under the WTO
Agreement. For example, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXVIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article 5 requires supporting evidence for assertions of
"substantial interest." Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Nego-
tiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 37, 57, 61 (1994).
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was no mechanism for identifying-a "substantial interest;" thus, in reality,
the burden was on each individual country to make its own determination
and then intervene. It is entirely possible to imagine that within the con-
sensual atmosphere of GATT countries might also have been reluctant to
challenge assertions of such interest, leading to the legitimation of self-
assertion through practice.
The term "substantial interest" assumed formal importance in the
1979 Tokyo Round Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance39 and in associated agreements.
40
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Understanding, each GATT Member with a
substantial interest in a matter before a panel could be heard after giving
notice. ' The conditional language used in the article (".... should have an
opportunity to be heard.. .") suggested that the right to intervene was not
absolute, however. Third parties wanting to intervene in pre-hearing
consultations had no free-standing right to do so, entitlement to receive the
litigants' submissions before the hearing, and access to settlement infor-
mation was restricted.42
An Agreed Description of Customary Practice regarding GATT dis-
pute settlement was annexed to the Understanding as a general statement
of procedural norms.43 The Agreed Description struck a careful balance
between the bilateral and multilateral aspects of the adjudicative process
by stating that "a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute is
clearly to be preferred," adding that "there is normally a presumption that
a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other contracting parties.""
It also observed that previous panels had heard views of "any contracting
party having a substantial interest in the matter, which is not directly
party to the dispute, but which has expressed in the Council a desire to
present its views.' ' 5 The Agreed Description's language indicated that,
39. Understanding Regarding Notification Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1979) [hereinafter Tokyo Round
Understanding].
40. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 15(2) GAT" B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 8
(1979); Agreement on Government Procurement, art. 9 GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 33
(1979); Agreement on Implementation of Art. VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade art. 3, GAT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 116 (1979) all contain references to "substantial
interest" in the context of intervention. The interpretation of these agreements will not be
discussed here.
41. Somewhat inconsistently, where Contracting Parties had settled a matter between them,
a Member "with an interest in the matter" had the right to receive settlement information "in so
far as it relate[d] to trade matters."
42. Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 39 art. 19.
43. Id at 215.
44. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 217.
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despite the bilateralizing influence of formal procedures embodied in the
Tokyo Round Understanding, there remained a strong orientation toward
multipartite dispute settlement within GAIT.
Having examined the controlling instruments, it is useful to remember
that words only communicate their true meaning in the context of their
usage. A more complete picture of third party practice and limits to
intervention under GATT can be had by reviewing panel reports and
drawing conclusions from the assembled evidence.46
The first impression provided by a review of panel reports is the sheer
number of potential third parties that were habitually notified about panel
proceedings.4 ' This fact demonstrates a willingness on the part of panels to
permit active intervention. This record indicates a strong tradition of
intervention in GAIT dispute resolution, at least since the early 1980s,
46. It is appropriate to observe that the terminology applied to third parties was inconsis-
tent. This could reflect a desire on the part of panels to avoid confusion with more generic usage
of the term "third party:' but it may also highlight the informality that has attended third party
status under the GATT. Parties have been variously referred to as "third parties" (Norway-
Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, GAT'T' B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 306
(1989); Denial of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear From Brazil,
June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 128 (1992) [hereinafter Non-Rubber Footwear]),
"third contracting parties" (United States-Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, June 22, 1989,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 331 (1989) [hereinafter Restrictions on Imports of Sugar]), and
"interested third parties" (Japan-Trade in Semi-conductors, May 4, 1988, GAT'T B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 116 (1988) [hereinafter Trade in Semi-conductors]; European Economic Community-
Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples Complaint by Chile, June 22, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D.
(36th Supp.) at 93 (1989) [hereinafter Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples]). The use of the
first two terms, when considered together, seems to suggest that some third parties might not be
GATT Members. The term "interested third parties" seems to imply that there might be two tiers
of third party, some with more interest than others. Whether these distinctions mean anything is
not clear.
47. See, e.g., GATT Unpublished Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
1994 GATTPD LEXIS 7 at 1, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna] (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand
and Venezuela reserving their right to intervene; Singapore registering its interest); European
Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Apples Complaint by United States, June 22,
1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36 Supp.) at 135 (1989) (Canada intervening as a third party; Chile,
Argentina, Australia and New Zealand reserving their right to intervene); Restrictions on
Imports of Dessert Apples, supra note 46 (Argentina and Canada intervened as third parties; the
United States, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand, Romania and Poland reserving their right to
intervene); Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and
Singapore intervening as third parties; Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Sweden (for the Nordic countries),
Switzerland and Thailand reserved the right to intervene); United States-Customs User Fee,
Feb. 2,1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 245 (1988) [hereinafter Customs User Fee] (Brazil,
Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries, and
Switzerland provided with the opportunity to appear; Australia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Peru and Singapore appearing).
[Vol. 18:615
Of Substantial Interest
and repudiates any claim that GATI' adjudication was somehow handi-
capped by third party participation.
However, panel reports do not always make clear which countries ac-
tually participated as third parties. Although many countries were notified,
some took part which were not listed as notified" and others reserved their
right to intervene without subsequently appearing. Some countries, more
ambiguously, simply "registered an interest"49
A number of reports mention third parties out of a persistent concern
for fair procedure. Panels demanded precision in the terms of reference
circulated among members so that third parties could make a considered
decision about intervention. Thus, in Restrictions on Imports of Sugar,50
the complainant, Australia, claimed that the reallocation of a portion of
the U.S.'s sugar quota for Guyana to Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad was
inconsistent with the principle of non-discriminatory administration of
quantitative restrictions under Article XIII:2 of the General Agreement.
The United States, as respondent, argued that the issue was not covered by
the panel's terms of reference because the issue had arisen after the estab-
lishment of the panel by the GAIT Council in September 1988. The panel
recognized that it had to interpret its terms of reference not only in the
light of the interests of the parties to the dispute, but also with regard to
the rights of third parties. It accepted the U.S. argument that because the
matter had arisen only after the establishment of the panel, Contracting
Parties had no reason to expect that the reallocation of U.S. sugar quotas
among Caribbean countries would arise. The panel therefore decided that
the reallocation was not part of its mandate. Similar comments appear in
other panel reports."
Another feature revealed by the panel reports is that the term
"substantial interest" was rarely taken literally. The record seldom dis-
closes any careful scrutiny of the nature of the substantial interest
asserted, nor does it disclose whether such assertions were ever success-
fully challenged. The relevant procedural rules do not make clear whether
parties seeking to intervene were required to state their interest for this
48. For example, in GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic
Community-Import Regime for Bananas, Jan. 18, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 177 (1995), Tanzania was
not listed as intervening but its submissions appear in the report.
49. It is unclear what the distinction is between reservation of a right to intervene and reg-
istration of an interest; see Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 47 (Singapore's
registration).
50. Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, supra note 46.
51. See GATT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Imposition of Countervail-
ing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 1992 WL 792950,
SCM/153 (Dec. 4, 1992); GAT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986).
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purpose. Thus, a third party submission could detail the link between the
third party and the respondent, as in the following description of Hong
Kong's position in a challenge brought by Canada and the EC of a U.S.
merchandise import fee:
Hong Kong stated that it had a particular interest in the matter be-
cause the United States was the principal market for its exports
and that as a result of the imposition of the merchandise process-
ing fee, the total cost of Hong Kong's exports to the United States
was estimated to increase by approximately U.S. $20 million in
1987.52
But more often, the panel treated the information of "substantial inter-
est" provided by the third party ambiguously. This treatment implies either
that the information was not supplied by the third party, or that the panel
overlooked or ignored it. Thus, manifesting a "substantial interest" was
not considered a necessary condition. An example of such a case--one of
many53-is the following description of Brazil's position in a challenge
brought against U.S. duties imposed on certain types of steel from the EC:
Brazil argued that the DOC had identified subsidization and cal-
culated subsidy margins on the basis of methodological
approaches that were unreasonable and devoid of economic ra-
tionale. Brazil requested the Panel to find that the United States
had rendered final determinations that contravened the United
States' basic obligations under the Agreement and the General
Agreement, in particular Articles 1 and 4 of the Agreement.' 4
From the panel's description it is impossible to tell whether Brazil's
interest was direct because Brazilian steel competed directly with the
European products targeted by U.S. countervailing duties, whether the
country had a more abstract interest in the case, or whether the panel
simply omitted to mention the link in its report. The insignificance of the
52. Customs User Fee, supra note 47.
53. See GATl Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Taxes on Automobiles, 1994 WL
910937, DS31/R (Oct. 11, 1994) (submissions of Sweden); GATT Unadopted Unpublished
Panel Report on Brazil-Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on
Milk, 1994 WL 10940, SCM/179 (Jan. 27, 1993) (submissions of the United States); GAT'T
Adopted Unpublished Panel Report on Korea-Antidumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal
Resins from the United States, 1993 WL 840282, ADP/92 (Apr. 2, 1993) (submissions of
Canada); GATT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Antidumping Duties on Gray
Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, 1992 WL 792944, ADP/82 (Sept. 7, 1992)
(submissions of the EC).
54. GATT Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 9, DRS/la (1994).
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term "substantial interest" was further highlighted by the fact that panels
accepted assertions of purely prospective interest as well.55
The meaning of "substantial interest" lost all qualification when in
certain cases, such as those reviewing subsidies, antidumping and coun-
tervailing findings by national authorities, the interest asserted was in
ensuring a fair process.56 To this extent, the "substantial interest" was one
possessed by all GATT Members equally. The possibility that a single
GATT Member might be hurt more than any other was hypothetical; a
"substantial interest" thus had to be imputed to all Members in order to
ensure compliance with the treaty language. In these instances, a
"substantial interest" meant nothing and had no use as a term of limita-
tion.
Panel reports also give a clearer idea of the scope of third party repre-
sentation. GATI' rules did not indicate whether GATT Members could act
as agents for other Members, but practice suggests this is true.57 Whether
this practice could be carried one step further to permit Members to
advance an interest on behalf of all Members is not known, although there
appears to be no reason why, given consent, this could not occur.5" At the
same time there is curious contrast in the fact that representation of the
55. In GATT Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Measures Affecting the Importation,
Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, 199 GATTPD LEXIS 15, DS44/R (Oct. 4, 1994), Australia
indicated that while it had negligible export interest in the U.S. market for the product involved,
the legislation resulted in clear interference with the importation of tobacco into the United
States and, if unchallenged, could encourage the imposition of similar measures on products of
direct interest to Australia. This reliance on indirect interests has continued under the WTO
Agreement. See infra, notes 109-110.
56. See GATT Unpublished Panel Report on EC-Imposition of Antidumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton Yam from Brazil, 1995 GATTPD LEXIS 3, ADP/137 (July 4, 1995); GATT
Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on German Exchange Rate Scheme for Deutsche Airbus,
1992 GATTPD LEXIS 13, SCM/142 (May 4, 1992).
57. At the Council meeting establishing the panel in Customs User Fee, supra note 47. In-
donesia explicitly reserved the right to intervene on behalf of its ASEAN partners and Sweden
was offered the opportunity to appear on behalf of the Nordic countries "in light of statements
made in previous Council meetings." Neither Indonesia nor Sweden ultimately made use of the
possibility. Sweden was notified that it could make a similar appearance on behalf of the Nordic
countries in Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46. The issue of representation is also raised
by the EC's participation in GATT. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GA7T Mem-
ber-Legal Conflicts between GATT Law and European Community Law in MEINHARD HILF Er
AL., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 23 (1986).
58. For example, Canada and Japan have intervened in Bananas III to comment on the
case's broader implications for the WTO. Both are importers of bananas but do not have any
direct interest in case. Press reports indicate Canada's submissions are with respect to the scope
of the GATS and its relationship with the GATT, and the applicability of the dispute settlement
rules to trade measures that are covered by a waiver from GAT rules. Japan's submission is
with respect to whether the EC's tariff rate quota is covered by the Agreement on Licensing
Procedures. See WTO Panel Allows Enhanced Role for ACP, Other Third Parties, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 20, 1996, at 15.
Summer 19971
Michigan Journal of International Law
Contracting Parties as a collective entity would have been impermissible
in light of the presumable restriction of intervention to "[individual]
contracting parties" in Article 15 of the Tokyo Round Understanding. The
same language would also appear to rule out third party participation by
the GATI' Secretariat or non-GATT Members.
While intervention on the side of the complainant was contemplated,
there was no procedure for a Member to intervene as co-respondent. It is
not immediately evident why this should cause a problem since the term
"third party" was not qualified in GATT instruments. Nevertheless, suc-
cessive panels interpreted "third party" to mean intervention on the side of
the complainant alone. On at least one occasion, however, the GATT
Council decided a country could assume a position analogous to that of
co-respondent.59
Despite the flexibility and even ambiguity, third party participation
was not entirely without limits. Panels established a practice of disre-
garding issues or defenses forwarded solely by third parties. In Customs
User Fee, ° for example, India intervened and requested that the panel
consider whether a U.S. duty exemption for goods from least developed
countries was consistent with MFN obligations. Two other interveners,
Australia and Singapore, also referred to this issue and to the related issue
of a duty exemption granted to certain countries under the U.S. Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act. The two complainants, Canada and the
EC, did not raise either matter but declared that they had no objection to
the panel pronouncing upon them. The panel observed that neither ex-
emption was GATT-consistent and concluded that "no answer in
opposition to [India, Australia and Singapore's] legal claims was given,
nor was the Panel aware of any that could be given."'" Nevertheless, the
panel concluded, it would not be appropriate to make a formal finding
59. In Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46, at 116 (1989) the issue was a bilateral trade
arrangement between Japan and the United States in semi-conductor products. The EC alleged
that the arrangement effectively restricted sales of Japanese semi-conductor products and
requested a panel. The Council established a panel and explained that, "given the special nature
of the matter to be examined:' the United States would be given "adequate opportunity ... to
participate in the work of the Panel as necessary and appropriate." The Council's holding
appears to have been influenced by the GATT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on
European Communities--Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries
in the Mediterranean, 1985 GATTPD LEXIS 4, L/5776 (1985). In the course of that case, the
panel decided that it would provide "adequate opportunities for [countries enjoying certain
preferential trading arrangements with the EC] to participate in the work of the panel as neces-
sary and appropriate." At least a dozen countries were allowed to intervene and several made
submissions in favor of the respondent. It is interesting to observe that this type of mass in-
volvement predated the GATT Bananas Trilogy by almost a decade.
60. Customs User Fee, supra note 47.
61. Id. at 290.
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because "GATT practice has been for panels to make findings only on
those issues raised by the parties to the dispute." Although no authority
was cited for this statement, it has been followed by subsequent panels."2
The "new issue" rule was interpreted strictly in other contexts as well.
For example, panels declined to consider apparently relevant arguments
when the parties that could have invoked them chose not to.63 Even where
a respondent admitted "it would not disagree" with an argument posited in
third party submissions, the argument was disregarded.
6
4
Panels also did not hesitate to invoke the bilateral nature of a dispute
as a limit to their remedial jurisdiction. One of the most noted cases of this
type was US.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua.6 The case arose
from the U.S. embargo in May 1985 on trade and transportation links with
Nicaragua. Nicaragua's exports to the U.S., valued at $162 million in
1980, had fallen to $20 million in 1985 due to various U.S. measures
against the Sandinista regime. Nicaragua's trade with its neighboring
states in the Central American Common Market was also severely dis-
rupted. Nicaragua argued before the panel that a recommendation to
permit it to withdraw its trade concessions with respect to the U.S. "would
be a meaningless step" because the U.S. embargo had already effectively
done so. As an alternative, Nicaragua sought a general waiver for other
GATT Members to allow them to extend more favorable treatment to
Nicaraguan products, notwithstanding these Members' MFN obligations,
thus, restoring the competitive relationship that existed for Nicaragua
when it joined GATT.
The panel observed that the conditions for granting waivers were re-
strictive. Because the panel felt it would be acting contrary to GATT
practice in recommending a change to third party obligations and because,
62. See also Non-Rubber Footwear supra note 46; Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note
46; Restrictions on Imports of Sugar supra note 46 (submission of the EC); European Economic
Community-Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, May 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D.
(37th Supp.) at 132 (1990) (submission of the United States) [hereinafter Parts and Compo-
nents].
63. See U.S.-Restrictions on Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984, GATT
B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67 (1985) (United States did not invoke Art. XXI); European Economic
Community-Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong,
July 12, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 129 (1984) (EC did not invoke Grandfather
Clause), as identified in MCGOVERN, supra note 9, at 36.
64. See Parts and Components, supra note 62. The United States, as a third party, had ar-
gued that GAT Article VI provided a basis for measures to prevent circumvention of anti-
dumping duties. During the proceedings the EC stated that, if the panel were to find that the anti-
circumvention duties were justifiable under Article VI, "it would not disagree" with such an
approach.
65. GATT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, [16053 (Oct. 13, 1986).
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in any event, no third party could be consulted since none had participated
in the hearing, it declined to make such a recommendation "on purely
procedural grounds." Bilateralism was also the theory underlying a panel
decision not to allow a third party to compel continuing argument in the
face of the parties' desire to compromise."
Despite strictness in some circumstances, it is conceivable that coun-
tries could intervene in order to make submissions for collateral purposes;
that is, for purposes going beyond the precise confines of the case. There
was always the possibility of making arguments for a prospective purpose,
comparable to the process of "reading in" during the passage of bills in the
U.S. Congress. This practice was hinted at in Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, where Australia submitted that:
the present dispute concerned solely the selective import prohibi-
tions by the United States on yellowfin tuna according to the
country of origin of the product. The dispute did not concern pro-
hibitions related to the fishing practices of certain countries, since
the prohibition could apply to those countries even if they met or
exceeded the standard for fishing practices for the product of
United States origin. Nor did the dispute concern trade in marine
mammals, or trade restrictions taken in accordance with any other
international treaty or arrangement. The United States had con-
firmed in its submission that it was not obligated by any other
treaty to maintain the trade restrictions against EEC Member
States. The Panel's findings would therefore have no implications
for the GATT consistency of measures taken under any other ex-
isting or future treaty directed to conservation of the environment.
... The United States measures in force did not require the pro-
tection of all dolphin life or health in the eastern tropical Pacific,
but were linked to feasible incidental mortality rates associated
with particular fishing methods.67
Australia's carefully crafted submission, as phrased by the panel, appears
concerned with defining what the U.S. measures were not, possibly to
preclude future GAIT challenges to its own legislation or treaties.
An examination of panel reports therefore concludes that while a bi-
lateral model formed the core of GAIT dispute resolution and implied a
limited role for interveners, GAIT's essential multilateralism favored a
liberal attitude to third parties in practice. The limits to intervention that
developed under GATT were more substantive than procedural. A
66. Japan-Measures on Imports of Leather, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at
320 (1980), as cited by MCGOVERN, supra note 9, at 36.
67. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 47.
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"substantial interest" was ambiguous and frequently not a standard at all,
but a third party's attempt to raise new issues was impermissible. There
were, of course, advantages and disadvantages to this posture. Inasmuch
as GATT dispute resolution had a strong consensual and collective focus,
active intervention permitted a comprehensive appreciation and resolution
of cases. But participation of this kind also created potential for overuse,
or worse, abuse. More detrimental still, perhaps, was the opportunity for
bias towards the perspective and interpretations of Members active in
asserting their third party rights, since these were mostly wealthy devel-
oped countries." In light of this historical perspective, current third party
law and practice under the WTO are now examined.
II. THIRD PARTIES AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
Details of the negotiations and structure of the WTO and GATT 1994
which emerged from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
are available elsewhere. It is sufficient here to note that as a result of the
Uruguay Round the coverage of GAIT was expanded and formalized and
the WTO was created to replace what were essentially interim institutional
measures dating from the late 1940s. The operative aspect of the WTO
was divided into four councils and a separate Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) designed to administer a set of reformulated dispute settlement
rules known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)."9 A new
"reverse consensus" rule came into being for the adoption of panel reports
by the Council, meaning that reports are adopted unless there is a consen-
sus against them. This reversed the previous rule, which had allowed
single countries to veto panel reports and caused some contentious reports
to remain unadopted.
68. An informal third party interest under GATT is that of developing countries. Various
provisions require consideration of developing country interests in decisionmaking. Recently,
this consideration has been explicitly endorsed with respect to least developed countries. See
Dispute Settlement Understanding Art. 24(1). Nevertheless, it remains unclear how these
interests are to be asserted in the abstract in disputes between developed countries. For a
discussion of WTO dispute settlement and developing countries see Alice Alexandra Kipel,
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, in THE WORLD TRADE OR-
GANIZATION: THE MULTINATIONAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 617 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
69. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 3 1; 33
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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The near identity of the third party provision in the Dunkel Draft of
199170 with that of the DSU suggests third party participation was not a
controversial issue during the final phase of the Uruguay Round. What is
different between the pre- and post-Uruguay Round GATT is the range of
subjects covered by the new GATT, particularly services and intellectual
property. These extend coverage of the agreement to topics that are inher-
ently harder to quantify and therefore it is more difficult to identify a
peculiar "substantial interest." To this extent, standards for third party
participation may become even more flexible and indeterminate under the
GATI 1994 than they have been in the past."
A. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
The DSU continues the aim of settling bilateral disputes within a
strong multilateral framework. Article 3(4), for example, attempts to
recognize a wider duty to provide appropriate outcomes for the parties and
other interests by indicating that recommendations and rulings are aimed
at achieving "a satisfactory settlement of the matter."72 It is rational to
assume that silence as to exactly whom the settlement is to satisfy implies
that panels should, to some extent, take into account the interests of all
parties to the GATT. This observation is supported by the language of
Article 3(5) requiring that solutions to matters formally brought up under
the DSU "shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member
under th[e contested] agreements.",7' Article 3(2) also states that the
"recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the
70. The "Dunkel Draft" from the GATT Secretariat, Dec. 20, 1991, THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS COMMrITEE (1992) at S.9. Among the changes between the Dunkel Draft and
the Understanding was the title ("third contracting parties" versus "third parties") and minor
clarification of the text. An earlier version of the draft, circulated as a "decision" arising from the
Montreal/Geneva Mid-Term Review of 1988-89, conditioned disclosure of written submissions
to third parties on the parties' permission. It also did not mention third party access to normal
GAIT dispute settlement procedures, as was later provided in Article 10(4). See General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay
Round, 28 I.L.M. 1025, 1033 (1989).
71. It is of interest that the terminology of "substantial interest" has also been used with
respect to the qualification of intervention in certain provisions of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, arts. 2006(3),
2008(3), H.R. REP. No. 103-159, vol. 1, at 712 (1993). See also North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, arts. 22(3), 24(2), 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, arts. 22(2), 27(3), 29(2), 32 I.L.M.
1502(1993).
72. DSU, supra note 69, at 1227.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements," including,
presumably, the rights and obligations of third parties.'
Article 10, entitled "Third Parties," is the principal section according
Member States the right to intervene. It emphasizes GATT's multilateral
focus by explicitly providing that both the interests of parties "and those
of other Members ... shall be fully taken into account during the panel
process."75 This section does not indicate exactly how these non-party
interests are to be taken into account, particularly when no party inter-
venes, but Article 10(2) identifies any Member possessing "a substantial
interest" as having the express right to make written submissions and to be
heard by a panel. Although the all-important term "substantial interest" is
found at least a dozen times in the GATT 1994 and its accompanying
agreements and is often trade-qualified,76 in Article 10 the term is not
qualified at all. The implication is that "substantial interest" has been
given a new, wider definition in DSU Article 10 than in previous GATT
usage. Where it is trade-related, the interest asserted must necessarily be
so.77 However, where it is not so qualified the "substantial interest" can be
different. This flexible application accords with the breadth of subject
matter now covered by DSU procedures.
From the point of view of potential third parties, the DSU incorpo-
rates a number of features improving earlier arrangements. Although
Article 10's language does not give third parties a general right to attend
hearings, this deficiency is mitigated by the requirement that third party
arguments be "fully taken into account" and that third party submissions
be "reflected in the panel report." Article 10(4) permits a third party which
considers that a matter already the subject of a panel proceeding "nullifies
or impairs benefits" to itself to have recourse to the dispute resolution
mechanism. If a panel is requested, the Article mandates the matter's
referral to the panel hearing the original case, most likely to avoid incon-
sistent decisions.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
76. "Substantial interest" occurs in the GATT 1994 and associated agreements twice in the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 23, once in the Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 4, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 25, once in the Agreement on
Agriculture art. 12, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 27, twice in the Agreement on Safeguards art. 5(2), 1
WTO Treaties Binder 327 and four times in the DSU, supra note 69.
77. The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 23 shows considerable effort by the negotia-
tors to circumscribe use of "substantial interest:' Article 5 requires a member which considers it
has a substantial interest to communicate its claim in writing with supporting evidence to a
member proposing to withdraw or modify a tariff concession.
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Two improvements outside Article 10 directly benefit third parties.
Article 3(6) provides that when settlements to matters formally raised
under the DSU are reached, these must be notified to the DSB where "any
Member may raise any point relating thereto.' '1 Article 4(11) allows a
member believing it has a substantial trade interest to join consultations
unless the respondent country objects. 9
The requirements for third party status remain minimal. Interveners
must have a substantial interest and notify the DSB in writing. A third
condition, that the matter is before a panel, is suggested by the phrase in
Article 10(2) that "[a]ny Member having a substantial interest in a matter
before a panel."0 Additional support for this view is the fact that the term
"third party" is first used in Article 10 and not in pre-panel proceedings
such as consultation, good offices, conciliation or mediation. However, the
interpretation is contradicted by Article 6 of the DSU Appendix 3 Work-
ing Procedures, which requires that "[a]ll third parties which have notified
their interest in the dispute to the DSB shall be invited in writing to
present their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the
panel."8' The implication seems to be that, presuming they have the requi-
site interest, Members attain third party status upon notification to the
DSB and then present their views at some subsequent time when a panel
is seized of the matter. The phrasing leaves open the possibility of pre-
panel third party participation.
Chinkin refers to "unequal intervention" where intervention takes
place after the original parties have committed themselves to their argu-
ments." She suggests that parties should not be disadvantaged by such
tactics. In the context of GATT, there is no rule on point, but analogous
practice with respect to parties is to disregard latecomers unless there is
78. DSU, supra note 69, at 1227.
79. In Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products WT/DS29, WTO
Dispute Settlement "State-of-Play" (last modified Sept. 29, 1997) <http://www.orgl
wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter Textile and Clothing Products], Hong Kong has com-
plained that Turkish quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing violate GATT
Articles XI and XIII. Turkey has replied that the measures were taken in order to adapt Turkish
commercial policy to the process of integration in a customs union with the EC. Following Hong
Kong's request for consultations, Turkey asked that Hong Kong accept the EC's participation in
consultations on equal terms with Turkey as "a joint exercise." Hong Kong has refused, although
the wording of DSU Article 4(11) suggests that the choice is that of the member "to which the
request for consultations was addressed," which is presumably Turkey. See Gustavo Nogueira,
The First Appellate Body Review: United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 n. 5 (1996).
80. DSU, supra note 69, at 1232 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1245.
82. See CHINKIN, supra note 18, at 183 (citing Malta, 1981 I.C.J. 3, 35).
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consent. 3 However, one can argue that the dispute resolution system
already contemplates a form of unequal intervention by permitting consid-
eration of panel reports by the relevant council.
B. Third Parties as "Third Participants": WTO Appellate Review
A new feature of the WTO dispute settlement machinery is appellate
review, provided by DSU Article 17 and elaborated upon in the Working
Procedures on Appellate Review. 4 Formal identification as a third party
under DSU Article 10 is essential because the Appellate Working Proce-
dures limit third party participation on appeal to those parties having
already "notified the DSB of a substantial interest" at the panel stage. 5 On
appeal a third party is termed a "third participant." It is permitted to make
written submissions and to be heard by a panel of the Appellate Body,
known as a "division."
The Appellate Working Procedures contain a number of important
features that help further define the concept of third party under the WTO
Agreement. Third participant status is accorded on notification to the
Appellate Body alone. There is no provision for reassessment by the
Appellate Body of the "substantial interest" asserted before the panel.
Furthermore, the Appellate Working Procedures make clear a Member
may not intervene for the first time in a case at the appellate stage. Ap-
pearance by third participants is optional" and the rules contemplate paper
submissions." However, a non-appearing third participant must remain
ready in case it is requested to answer questions by the division and is thus
obligated to respond."
83. In GATT Unpublished Panel Report on European Economic Community-Member
States' Import Regimes for Bananas, 1993 GATTPD LEXIS 11, DS32/R (June 3, 1993)
[hereinafter Bananas 1], the panel received a letter from the representative of Belize formally
requesting that the panel suspend its proceedings two days before hearings began. Belize
requested that the parties begin consultations immediately and that it be admitted as a full
participant in the panel proceedings. The panel denied the request to suspend consultations
because the 60-day consultation period had expired, and also denied the Belizean request to
participate because the parties could not agree to it between themselves.
84. World Trade Organization Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
35 I.L.M. 495 (1996) [hereinafter Appellate Working Procedures].
85. Article 17(4) reads, "Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel
report. Third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant
to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be
heard by, the Appellate Body:' Intriguing is the fact that a third party apparently has no affirma-
tive duty to make submissions before the panel in order to preserve its right to make them before
the Appellate Body. Id
86. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 84, art. 27(3).
87. The text of Appellate Working Procedures Article 27(3) states that any third participant
which has filed a submission "may appear" implying that written submissions are sufficient.
88. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 84, art. 28(1).
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There are some subtle distinctions between third party practice before
panels and divisions of the Appellate Body. Under DSU Article 10(3), a
third party can make written submissions but is only allowed to receive
the parties' submissions at the first meeting of the panel, which can con-
strain the ability of third parties to effectively respond to issues. However,
under Article 24 of the Appellate Working Procedures, third participants
are given twenty-five days following the filing of the Notice of Appeal to
make written submissions. Because this is fifteen days longer than the
appellants have to make submissions, there is an interim for a third par-
ticipant to carefully consider and respond to the appellant's position. This
advantage disappears if the third participant intervenes on the respondent's
behalf because the respondent also has twenty-five days to make submis-
sions. 9
The Appellate Working Procedures do not indicate the process to be
followed if a party has intervened in a non-party capacity before the panel,
as the United States did in Japan-Trade in Semi-conductors,9° and then
seeks to participate on appeal. Article 16(1) of the Appellate Working
Procedures allows a division to modify its process where a "procedural
question arises that is not covered by the rules."9' Presumably, whatever
modified process was agreed upon would apply in such a case.
C. Further Issues
The DSU and Appellate Working Procedures leave a number of unre-
solved issues that future panels, divisions, and perhaps ultimately the
WTO itself, will have to address. Foremost is the prospect that third
parties remain procedurally disadvantaged in WTO proceedings. Under
the DSU, they are only permitted to attend a single session of a hearing.9
This limitation constrains their ability to follow the proceedings and react
to developments in camera. How strictly it will apply remains to be seen.
89. Id. art. 22(1).
90. Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46.
91. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 77, art. 16(1).
92. Article 2 of the DSU Working Procedures requires that panels meet in closed sessions,
while Article 6 formally permits third party attendance only at "a session" of a panel meeting,
not at the entire meeting itself. The Appellate Working Procedures are more ambiguous on third
participant attendance and the secrecy of division hearings. Article 24 refers to third parties
participating as third participants "in the appear' and Article 27(3) indicates that third partici-
pants "may appear to make oral arguments or presentations at the oral hearing" without further
qualification. While there is no blanket secrecy provision in the Appellate Working Procedures
comparable to that which exists in Art. 2 of the DSU Working Procedures, there are various
qualifications of confidentiality in the Appellate Body Rules of Conduct. See Appellate Working
Procedures, supra note 84, Annex II: Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. VI [hereinafter Appellate Body Rules of
Conduct]
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The issue of an appropriate remedy for third parties under the DSU is
also unsatisfactory. Compensation is limited to "any party having invoked
the dispute settlement procedures."93 Third parties do not invoke the
dispute settlement machinery and therefore are precluded from seeking
compensatory awards. The DSU's language thus restricts third parties to
seeking declarative relief.
Finally, active third party intervention makes panel selection diffi-
cult.94 DSU Article 8(3) prohibits the selection of panel members who are
citizens of countries involved in a dispute, including third parties. As more
third parties participate in cases, therefore, the pool of potential panelists
shrinks. Curiously, this same restriction does not apply to division mem-
bers.95
D. Third Party Practice under GATT and the WTO: The Bananas Trilogy
At present, third party and third participant practice under the WTO
has not been markedly different from what it was before the Uruguay
Round. Only a few issues have arisen under the new system and their
treatment suggests a "business as usual" attitude towards intervention.
This is in keeping with the identity of the pre- and post-Uruguay Round
third party provisions and the WTO Agreement's Continuity Clause.96
For example, in its first decision the Appellate Body expressed the
familiar concern that respondents' conditional arguments were unfair, in
part because these arguments were not raised in the appellant's Notice of
Appeal. This aspect of the decision demonstrates the Appellate Body's
appropriate concern for third party rights, even in absence of intervention.
In another case before a panel, the United States acted consistently with
past practice in reserving its right to submit its views as a third party out
93. DSU, supra note 69, art. 22(2). See also id. art. 3(7).
94. Active third party intervention can hamper the DSB's ability to find panelists. Debra
Steger, Counsel to the Appellate Body, has referred to this problem, saying that "[iln the WTO's
first year of operation, most of the panelists have come from either Switzerland or New Zealand,
with Norway also a popular choice because of its position as one of the few remaining European
countries that is not an EU member." See WTO: Sharp Increase seen in WTO Disputes Including
Many from Developing Countries, BNA INT'L TRADE DAiLY, at D-4 (Oct. 18, 1996). The
Appellate Body itself is not affected by this problem because division members participate
"regardless of national origin". See Appellate Working Procedures art. 6(2). Nevertheless,
division members do have obligations of independence, impartiality and confidentiality. See
Appellate Body Rules of Conduct, supra note 92, art. 7(1).
95. Appellate Body Rules of Conduct, supra note 87, art. 7(1).
96. "[Ihe WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices fol-
lowed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947." WTO Agreement art. XVI(l).
97. See WTO Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 615-16 (May 20, 1996).
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of mere "concerns of principle," even though the U.S. was not then ex-
porting the product in contention.98
The consistent treatment of third parties under old and new GATT
dispute settlement has been underlined by a trilogy of cases concerning
the regime for bananas in the European Community. The most recent case
in the series, Bananas III, was canvassed at the beginning of this article.
The trilogy itself is the product of a confluence of two changes of law-
one in the European Community, the other in GATT. Because of their
timing, the changes have generated three decisions: the first, reviewing the
old European regulations for consistency with GATT 1947, the second,
reviewing the new European regulations for consistency with GATT 1947,
and the third, reviewing the new European regulations for consistency
with GATT 1994. To better understand the issues of standing that the
trilogy raises, it is necessary to review some background.
Since 1988, banana consumption in the EC has accounted for 40% of
the world's total, the largest single share. Until 1993, there was no com-
mon EC tariff structure for bananas-a legacy of history, different foreign
aid policies, and disparate national consumption patterns. Five EC mem-
bers-France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom-permitted
duty-free entry for bananas grown in the EC and in their former colonies
located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Six other EC members-
the Benelux countries, Denmark, Greece and Ireland-also permitted
duty-free entry for bananas from ACP countries, but imposed a 20% ad
valorem duty on imports from elsewhere. Germany alone permitted duty-
free imports irrespective of source.9 Most of its bananas originated in
Latin America.
In February 1993, five Central and South American banana exporting
countriesm0° requested the establishment of a GATT panel under the Tokyo
Round Understanding to examine all national banana regulations in the
EC, with the exception of Germany's, as potentially discriminatory under
GATT. A panel was established to hear the case, referred to as Bananas I.
Seven other countries reserved their rights to make submissions, but only
98. The matter, GATT Unpublished Panel Report on European Community-Trade De-
scription of Scallops, 1996 GATTPD LEXIS 1, WT/DS7, WT/DS 12, WT/DS 14, (Aug. 5, 1996)
[hereinafter Trade Description of Scallops], involved a consolidated dispute brought by Canada,
Chile and Peru against a French Government order on the labelling of scallops. The case was
settled while the hearing was in progress in July, 1996. See WTO Panel To Probe Japan's
Domestic Liquor Taxation Scheme, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. 1650 (1995).
99. Germans have a high per capita consumption of bananas and consider the fruit a
"cultural icon". See Jack J. Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can Heal the Split in the
Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1294 (1995).
100. The requesting countries were Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and
Venezuela.
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Brazil, Mexico and the Philippines took the opportunity to do so. In
addition, the delegations of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Madagas-
car and Senegal-all ACP countries--expressed an interest in
participating and a special procedure was agreed to for this purpose.'0 ' The
panel did not elaborate as to why ACP participation required a special
procedure, although presumably this was because the ACP members
wanted to intervene on behalf of the respondent EC. It is also unclear
whose interests the ACP members purported to represent: those of all
seventy Lom6 Convention countries, a subgroup thereof, or simply their
own national interests.'0 2 This is an important question because not all
Lom6 Convention countries are GATr Members. If the five-member
group made submissions on behalf of the entire Convention membership,
then this resulted in indirect standing in GAT for non-GATl Members.' 3
The panel ultimately concluded that the national banana regulations,
specifically tariffs and quantitative restrictions, were inconsistent with
GAT. In June 1993, it recommended that these be made to conform.
While Bananas I was being considered, Council Regulation 404/93,
establishing a tariff rate quota for bananas entering the European Commu-
nity, became effective in July 1993. The motive behind the new regulation
was the drive for a single internal market by 1992.'' The regulation
101. The decision, Bananas I, supra note 83, indicates that the Contracting Parties agreed
as follows:
(i) that the representatives of Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire, Jamaica, Madagascar
and Senegal would be invited to all panel meetings at which the parties
were present;
(ii) that [these] parties would have to make a submission if they were to attend
Panel meetings and that submissions made by such contracting parties
should be made in writing, or if made orally, would also be made available
in writing;
(iii) that [these] representatives.., would receive all submissions of the parties;
and,
(iv) that these same contracting parties would be invited by the Panel to speak
as appropriate.
The panel cautioned, however, that "this procedure should not be considered a precedent for
future panels in light of the very special circumstances of the case." Id
102. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Senegal appear to have made submissions
on behalf of the "African ACP Contracting Parties." Jamaica appears to have made similar
submissions on its own behalf and those of "its Caribbean counterparts" but confined much of
its argument to the continuing validity of colonial preferences it had received from Britain upon
independence. ld.
103. In 1993, fifty-five of the seventy ACP countries belonging to the Lomd Convention
were members of GATT.
104. See KEES JAN KUILWIJK, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND THE GATT DILEMMA:
PUBLIC INTEREST VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? 187-88 (1996). Though restrictive, Regulation
404/93 was part of an adoption of a policy of free trade in the Community, one benefit of which
was supposed to be more efficient mechanisms for providing foreign aid.
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permitted up to 2 million tonnes of bananas to enter the market, with
857,700 tonnes being reserved for bananas from traditional ACP sources.
These ACP bananas continued to enter duty-free, but those over quota
were assessed a duty of 750 ecu per tonne. The balance of the quota,
approximately 1.2 million tonnes, was reserved for third country bananas
and non-traditional ACP bananas. Third country bananas under quota
were assessed a duty of 100 ecu per tonne; over quota, the duty rose to
850 ecu per tonne. The regulation also instituted a contentious system of
import licences. These were allocated to traders according to their tradi-
tional source of supply, with 66.5% being reserved for third country
banana importers, 30% for traditional ACP banana importers, and the
balance of 3.5% for non-traditional ACP banana imports. The new scheme
was roundly criticized by Latin American banana producers as depriving
them of market share.
In June 1993, as Regulation 404/93 was about to go into effect, the
same five Central and South American banana exporting countries that
had launched Bananas I requested the establishment of a GATT panel
regarding Regulation 404/93. A panel was created under the Tokyo Round
Understanding to hear the case, referred to as Bananas II. At least a
dozen countries," including many of the ACP producers who had taken
part in Bananas I, expressed an interest in participating in the panel's
work and were allowed to do so. The panel report does not disclose
whether any special procedure was agreed to. The panel simply indicated
that "in the interest of transparency among contracting parties having a
substantial interest in the trade of bananas, it would be reasonable to invite
such countries to meetings of the Panel."107 The report also does not reveal
in what capacity the ACP producers participated. The report indicates
that several ACP countries made lengthy submissions claiming that
elimination of their Lom6 Convention banana preference would put into
question "the survival of much or most of their economy."'" Other
producers, such as Brazil and Tanzania, contested the indirect' ° or
105. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic Community-Import
Regime for Bananas, Jan. 18, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 177, 181 (1995) (not adopted) [hereinafter Ba-
nanas Il].
106. The third parties invited by the panel to participate were Belize, Brazil, Cameroon,
Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Madagascar, the Philippines, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. However, the panel report discloses that
other countries, such as Tanzania, were also represented.
107. Bananas II, supra note 105, at 182.
108. Id. at 212.
109. The panel noted the indirect effect of a change in EC regulations of bananas on Bra-
zil, despite the fact that Brazil was not a substantial supplier to the EC at that time. The panel
mentioned trade diversion felt by Brazilian banana exporters, the decrease in Brazil's trade
[Vol. 18:615
Of Substantial Interest
prospective "' effect of the regulation. The panel considered these submis-
sions, but in finding against the validity of Regulation 404/93 stressed that
"it had to take into account that its terms of reference were to examine the
EEC measures at issue exclusively in terms of their legal consistency with
the General Agreement" and not broader measures of concern."' It went
on to observe that the Contracting Parties had at their disposal the possi-
bility of approving the regulation under GAIT Articles XXIV:10 or
XXV:5. In doing so "economic and social considerations" could be taken
into account. The panel concluded that "nothing in its report would pre-
vent the parties to the Lom6 Convention from achieving their treaty
objectives, including the objective of promoting the production and com-
mercialization of bananas from ACP countries through the use of policy
instruments consistent with the General Agreement. ' "2
Since Bananas II, the EC has effectively blocked adoption of both the
first and second panel reports, sought and received a waiver from GATF
for its Lom6 Convention obligations,"3 and concluded a compromise
Framework Agreement with some of the Bananas H litigants."14 There
remains, however, serious discontent with the Community banana regime,
balance and domestic instability, as well as the impact on associated domestic industries such as
packaging and transportation. Id. at 210.
110. Tanzania, for example, noted that its production of bananas was currently consumed
domestically but that there existed a potential to develop production for exports. On this basis
Tanzania mentioned its concern that the panel's deliberations could have a negative effect for
those ACP countries that benefited from a preferential trading regime with the EC as a result of
Lom6 IV. ld. at 214.
111. Id. at 229.
112. Id.
113. The text of the waiver, sought and received by the EC in December 1994, states that:
"the terms and conditions set out hereunder ... shall be waived, until 29 February
2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide prefer-
ential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant
provisions of the Fourth Lom Convention, without being required to extend the same
preferential treatment to like products of any other contracting party."
The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Dec. 19, 1994, GATT Doc. U7604 at 2 (Dec. 19,
1994).
114. The EC concluded the Framework Agreement in March 1994 with four of the five
original Bananas 1I litigants (Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela). Only Guatemala
refused to join. The Agreement was an attempt to appease the litigants with a guaranteed share
of the EC market and an in-quota rate of 75 ecu per tonne. In return, the litigants agreed not to
press for adoption of the Bananas 11 panel report. The Agreement provides that of the global
tariff quota of 2 million tonnes, Colombia was to be allotted 21%, Costa Rica 23.4%, Nicaragua
3% and Venezuela 2%. Both Colombia and Costa Rica later defected from this arrangement
under U.S. pressure, but not before the Community succeeded in having these respective shares
incorporated into its Uruguay Round schedule by virtue of Article 10 of the Agreement, thereby
giving them permanence.
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stoked, in part, by the deft diplomacy of the United States."5 In May 1993,
several dissatisfied countries began Bananas 111 under the DSU, as out-
lined above. This last challenge involves granting observer status to an
undisclosed number of ACP countries, as well as traditional third party
status to Canada and Japan."
6
Once again, it is not clear on whose behalf the ACP countries appear.
They sought "enhanced third party status" but had to settle for standing as
"observers." The distinction between the two forms of representation is
not evident, nor is it apparent how "enhanced third party status" differs
from ordinary "third party status." Again, the difference may be related to
the side on which a country seeks to intervene. An alternative explanation
is that "enhanced third party status" is a term coined in the trade press.
In its interim decision on the issue of ACP standing, the Bananas III
panel indicated that two factors motivated its grant of observer status: the
important economic interests at stake for the countries concerned and their
third party status in Bananas I and H. As criteria of limitation, economic
impact and precedent approximate "substantial interest." Both are sub-
stantial to the countries concerned. At the same time, they differ from
"substantial interest." This is acceptable if one remembers that the Ba-
nanas Trilogy does not involve a classic third party intervention under
GATF, that is, it involves intervention on behalf of the complainant.
Instead, the Bananas Trilogy raises the issue of intervention on behalf of
the respondent, which is virtually indistinguishable from more conven-
tional third party practice.
At the same time the decision on standing is noteworthy because it
went beyond the "letter" of DSU rules in creating a new status whose
closest precedent was the ad hoc creation of the GATT Council in Trade
in Semi-conductors."7 The term "observer" cannot be found in the DSU.
Rather, it is a creation of the panel's inherent power to develop its own
process, as set out in DSU Article 1(2).
The panel's decision is problematic from the point of view of consis-
tency, however, because it immediately raises the question of when
"observer" status is to be accorded. It also leaves the ACP members in
limbo with respect to any appeal of Bananas III, which many consider
likely to occur given the history of contention. This is because observers
do not, strictly speaking, fall within the definition of "third party" for the
purposes of the Appellate Working Procedures, and, as noted above,
115. See U.S. to Press Costa Rica, Colombia to Kill Banana Framework, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 5, 1996, at 3; U.S. Presses Ecuador to Join WTO Challenge of EU Banana Rules,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 26, 1996, at 24.
116. See supra note 58.
117. Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46.
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meeting this definition is essential for the preservation of any right to
participate in the appeal. It remains to be seen whether the Appellate Body
will interpret Article 16(1) of the Appellate Working Procedures liberally
to make room for observer participation on appeal.
The Bananas Trilogy reflects a trend in which a range of interests is
being dealt with under GATT in order to achieve a comprehensive resolu-
tion of a dispute. In part, this is a sign of GATIT's success to date.
Liberalized trading norms have fostered global economic interdependence
which have, in turn, meant progressively closer ties that can be easily
upset. Several cases involving multiple parties are currently either before
panels or divisions, or have already been decided."' Third party standing
is only one aspect of their multilateralization.
The question posed at the beginning of this article was how limits on
participation are to be imposed in such an interdependent environment.
GATT has avoided formal restriction, as embodied in the term "substantial
interest," in favor of practice derived restrictions on the raising of new
issues. A review of the caselaw also reveals that both group representation
and paper submissions are acceptable, meaning that these might be en-
couraged, or even mandated, among third parties without significant
departure from current WTO law or practice. In order to formulate addi-
tional ways of limiting intervention in the context of the WTO, it is
worthwhile to examine how other international adjudicators have re-
strained third party intervention.
III. INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
A. The International and European Courts of Justice
The original predecessor to the ICJ was established in 1899 and its
procedure was heavily influenced by arbitral law."' The European Court
of Justice (ECJ) is a younger creation, having been founded in 1950. Its
jurisdiction and mandate approximate more directly the working of a
municipal court. The differences between the two models do not obscure
118. See GATT Unpublished Panel Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1996
GTTWPD LEXIS 2 WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS1 R, (July 11, 1996) [hereinafter Taxes
on Alcoholic Beverages]; Trade Description of Scallops, supra note 98; Textile and Clothing
Products, supra note 79; Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 1997
WL 442326, (Aug. 5, 1997) (complaints by the European Communities (WT/DS54), Japan (2)
(WT/DS55, 64) and the United States (WT/DS59)).
119. SHABTAi ROSENNE, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
14(1993).
Summer 1997]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the fact that they share a number of similarities with respect to third party
law and practice.
Third party intervention before the ICJ occurs pursuant to Articles 62
and 63 of the Court's Statute.20 Each article applies in a distinct situation.
Article 62 permits a State which considers that it has "an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected" by a case before the ICJ to request inter-
vention, which the Court must allow or deny. Article 63, in contrast,
declares in broad language that countries party to a convention, the con-
struction of which is at issue before the Court, have a "right to intervene."
The logic behind the statutory distinction is evident; an interest in inter-
vention is presumed in the treaty context by membership.
The function of Article 62 seems to require a stricter standard than
Article 63, but in fact both have been interpreted narrowly by the Court.
There have been only seven applications for intervention in the history of
the ICJ and its predecessors and only two have been successful. ' This
record has led at least one commentator to observe that intervention before
the ICJ "seems at present no more than a remote possibility."'2
Most relevant for present purposes is Article 63, which has been for-
mally at issue before the Court only three times. In two older cases,
Article 63 was interpreted liberally to allow third party participation.
Today, however, both of these decisions are of some vintage and do not
reflect the recent restrictive tone of the Court. Hardly surprising in light of
third party practice under GATT is the ICJ's concern with countries
demonstrating adequate "interest." More recently, it has gone beyond mere
120. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153 (1946).
121. Before the Permanent Court of International Justice, forerunner of the current Court,
there was a successful attempt to intervene in S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., France, Italy and Japan v.
Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Poland intervening). Before the ICJ, there has been one
successful intervention under Article 63 in Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. Rep.
71 (Cuba intervening). Other requests to intervene made under Article 62 were denied, including
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 320 (Fiji requesting intervention); Case
Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1981 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Malta
requesting intervention); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya/Malta), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Italy requesting intervention) and Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (Honduras/El Salvador), 1990 I.C.J. Rep. 92 (Nicaragua requesting interven-
tion). A request to intervene was made, and denied, under Article 63 in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 215 (El Salvador
requesting intervention).
122. Christine Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention before the International Court of Justice,
80 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 531 (1986) [hereinafter Third-Party intervention]. See also Tania Licari,
Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute of the ICJ, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 267 (1982);
Natalie S. Klein, Multilateral Disputes and the Doctrine of Necessary Parties in the East 7imor
Case, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 305 (1996).
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interest, as reflected by treaty membership, to find that the purpose of the
intervention was not genuine and to deny the declaration.'23
The ICJ has also held that mere preoccupation with principles of law,
as reflected in a declaration under Article 63, is insufficient to sustain an
intervener's interest. 24 There is thus no concept of intervention for what
could be termed "public rights" or obligations erga omnes. This posture
has been criticized as a severely constrained view of the Court's mandate,
a criticism made compelling in light of the mandatory language of Article
63 and the enforcement machinery of many modem treaties."
Jurisprudence relating to third parties before the ECJ is also helpful in
formulating ways of limiting intervention under the WTO. The source of
jurisdiction of the ECJ derives from the constituent statutes of the Euro-
pean Community, the European Atomic Energy Agency, and the European
Coal and Steel Community. These communities, known collectively since
1994 as the "European Union," together form an integrated whole, with
the Court constituting the chief judicial organ. For this reason, appeals
from national courts on a broad range of issues are accepted. The ECJ can
therefore be regarded as a hybrid between the ICJ, where only States may
appear, and a municipal court, where traditional private parties litigate.
Broadly speaking, all three constituent statutes of the Union contain
comparable provisions for intervention in contentious proceedings.26
Their general framework, however, differs from that of the ICJ in the
sense that intervention is more readily available to certain parties in
certain types of cases. The EC and Euratom statutes permit Member
States and the Community to intervene in all contentious proceedings
before the Court. Private parties may intervene in cases between Commu-
nity institutions and individuals, but must demonstrate that they have an
interest in the outcome of the case. Member countries and Community
institutions do not need to demonstrate a justification to intervene on the
theory that the Community's integrative interest must be asserted in
123. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392, 431, El Salvador claimed it wanted to
intervene under the Statute of the Court and several inter-American conventions. The ICJ
characterized the contents of El Salvador's declaration as relating more properly to the merits
phase of the case. The Court therefore rejected the declaration.
124. See Third-Parry Intervention, supra note 122, at 514.
125. For example, treaties under the U.N. system can be enforced by the Security Council
under U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2. By definition all written treaties concluded after 1980 are
subject to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 l.L.M. 679 (1969),
which also contains enforcement machinery.
126. K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 153
(2d ed. 1994).
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litigation and that members and institutions are best able to represent this
interest.
As with the ICJ, a principal area of contention is whether a third party
can show the requisite interest, which has been interpreted as an interest in
the operative part of the final judgment. Once accepted, third parties are
allowed wide latitude to fashion their arguments as long as they sustain
the result of the case or the success of the arguments. Elaborate jurispru-
dence has grown up based on extensive precedent. The main trend has
been summarized by one authority as follows:
It seems clear from the cases that, to justify intervention, the re-
sult of the case must affect the intervener's legal position, his
economic position ... or, possibly, his freedom of action. The ef-
fect must flow directly from the precise subject matter of the
dispute, which is to be settled in the operative part of the judg-
ment, and not to be collateral to it; it must be concrete, or real,
and not abstract or theoretical .... 7
The intervener is not allowed to determine the scope of the proceed-
ings by introducing a new claim. The ECJ's Rules of Procedure state that
the intervener must accept the case as it is."2 The intervener is not, how-
ever, required to put forward positive arguments in favor of the total
acceptance or rejection of the case as argued by one of the parties. He or
she can argue selectively on certain points in the manner of amicus curiae,
and government parties and EC institutions can make hybrid submissions.
There is also authority for the principle that interveners can raise a new
ground or exceptions that the Court could consider of its own motion and
third parties can make use of any argument to support a party's position
even if it conflicts with those advanced by the party in whose support they
are intervening.'29 Lasok notes that the current wording of statutes in the
Community suggests that the intervener can raise matters of fact and law
that have not previously been raised by the parties virtually without limit,
but adds that there is little caselaw on point.'3°
The extensive ECJ caselaw affords opportunities for comparison be-
tween the ICJ, ECJ, and WTO. It is notable that in each system state
parties predominate and are in a privileged position in seeking third party
status. This position no doubt reflects the posture of international law that
only States are actors. Yet, it is possible that there are different reasons
motivating the rules on intervention in each system. In the ICJ, the Court
127. Id. at 167-68.
128. Id. at 168.
129. Id. at 170.
130. Id at 171.
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has struggled to maintain a bilateral focus because of an acute awareness
that, as consent is the basis of its jurisdiction, intervention detracts from a
state party's reasonable expectation that it will only have one adversary to
oppose. Active intervention may make countries less willing either to
submit to the court's jurisdiction or to accept its judgment.'3'
There is no similar concern under the European or WTO system be-
cause of the existence of a uniform treaty providing a structure for dispute
settlement. States cannot derogate from the respective system without
consequences, but no such repercussion can be expected from withdrawal
or failure to attend before the ICJ. Indeed, nonattendance before the ICJ
has been the subject of much scholarly commentary.' Strict interpretation
of the right to intervene before the ICJ is thus consistent with consensual
jurisdiction because it strikes at the heart of the Court's competence. It is
also consistent with the Court's origin as an adjudicative body founded on
arbitral principles; in traditional arbitration, third parties have no stand-
ing.'33 Since these attributes are a lesser concern in the ECJ and WTO,
they should presumptively be more permissive towards intervener status
before them.
The WTO and ECJ are not identical, however. Their aims differ sub-
stantially, especially in that the EC seeks to integrate States in a manner
that the WTO does not. The WTO's main aim is to increase global pros-
perity through economic interdependence. A teleologic view of this
purpose suggests that in the WTO's final stage country members will
probably remain the basis of the WTO system. Consequently, as the
WTO's principal actors, countries must be the ones accorded the greatest
rights in it. Their intervener status must be recognized if such status is to
be accorded to any entity at all. The ECJ can afford greater third party
participation because the range of interests it represents is broader than
that of the WTO.
B. Limits to Intervention under GATT
In sum, the aim of the WTO suggests a more liberal attitude to inter-
vention than the ICJ, but a less generous one than that of the ECJ. This
intermediate posture is reinforced by three considerations.
131. Third Party Intervention, supra note 122, at 530.
132. See Keith Highet, Nonappearance and Disappearance before the International Court
of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1987) (reviewing JEROME B. ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(1984) and H.W.A. THIRLWAY, NONAPPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1985)).
133. Chinkin notes that "the concept of party autonomy is strongest where the parties pro-
vide for an ad hoc arbitration." See CHINKIN, supra note 18, at 249.
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The first is the effect of precedent. Intervention is based on the princi-
ple that a decision will have an effect beyond the parties directly involved.
At the outset of this article, it was observed that a given decision can have
two effects: one is immediate as a result of the facts of that particular
decision, the other is prospective as a result of the case's effect on other
cases. Leaving aside the case of immediate impact, the principle of pro-
spective effect must, in turn, be based on a system of strong precedent
because without precedent, present pronouncements do not bind the
future. But a feature of international law, as distinct from municipal law, is
a lack of strict precedent, with each case decided according to the justice
of the circumstances, which may, but need not,"' mean recourse to previ-
ous decisions. The precedential effect of decisions is therefore much more
ambiguous. On one hand, the lack of precedential effect has been cited as
a reason for non-participant parties to not be concerned about decisions in
international law. In the GATT context, this view has been given expres-
sion by DSU Article 3(2), which states that "[riecommendations and
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in [GATT]."'35 On the other hand, it has been forcefully argued
that decisions in international law do have an impact, particularly when
they contain persuasive reasoning.
The interpretation of GATT has followed a middle course between
contending extremes. The Appellate Body visited the question of prece-
dent in Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 136 acknowledging that adopted panel
reports "create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and,
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any
dispute. ' 37 The Appellate Body went on to observe, however, that panel
reports are "not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular
dispute between the parties to that dispute."'38 It added that their "character
and legal status have not been changed by the coming into force of the
WTO Agreemeit."'39 Thus, adopted panel reports are not binding, but can
create "legitimate expectations." They do not require non-participating
parties to act in any way, although they may create "legitimate expecta-
tions" that members will behave according to certain norms in future. This
134. Id. at 20, 54.
135. DSU, supra note 65, at 1227.
136. WTO Report of the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WI
I.E.L.-I-B-81, WT/DS8/AB/R, WTIDSIOIAB/R, WTIDS I I/R (Sept. 25, 1996).
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id
139. Id. The Appellate Body also observed that unadopted reports have "no legal status in
the GATT or WTO system" but agreed that "a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in
the reasoning" of such a report. Id at 25 (citing Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 118, at
126.
[Vol. 18:615
Of Substantial Interest
system of attenuated precedent may promote a liberal attitude toward
intervention among WTO members.
Secondly, the intermediate posture on intervention is reinforced by the
argument that sovereign consent is, at least in theory, a subsidiary concern
under GATT. Nations consent to be members in the GATI', as they do to
the Statute of the ICJ. Thereafter, however, they are subject to a scheme
which they cannot opt out of."4 Members have no recourse in non-
attendance' 4' or reservation, as they might have if they were contemplating
defending an action in the ICJ.1'4 Given the more binding nature of the
GAIT 1994 and that it is the only regime where certain concerns can be
resolved, third party status should be more accessible than it might be
otherwise.
The third and final consideration is an inference that arises from the
negotiating history of the Uruguay Round. Had the Members of GAIT
been attracted to the notion of restrictive access for third parties, perhaps
they would have allowed appeals of panel decisions to the ICJ. There was
every opportunity to do so, and precedent for such a procedure in the
Havana Charter. The fact that the Members did not implies that they
roundly rejected the Court's model of rigidity and inefficiency, including
its ambiguous attitude toward third party participation. But if this interme-
diate posture is in fact sound, are there means of limiting intervention
where it threatens to be unmanageable or is being abused? Chinkin,
writing in the context of the ICJ, identifies purpose, consent, and the type
of case as determinants of intervention.
43
The DSU currently says very little about purpose. DSU Article 3(10)
mandates good behavior by members and appears to rule out intervention
for improper motives, such as delay or prevarication. As seen, however,
Members have used third party status imaginatively and panels have
shown reluctance to question assertions of "substantial interest." Never-
theless, in extreme cases improper purpose could be a ground for
restricting third party participation.
Chinkin's second determinant is consent, which plays a minor role in
the DSU. Article 4(11) conditions third party participation in consultations
140. It is possible for Members to obtain waivers under GATT Art. XXV, but under GAI"
1994 these are now more difficult to obtain.
141. Notwithstanding the above, the United States has recently threatened not to appear
before a panel established to examine U.S. anti-Cuba legislation. See David E. Sanger, U.S.
Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
142. One of the key advantages of the WTO Agreement over previous arrangements is its
uniformity. Members are no longer able to apply "GATT a la carte," except with respect to
certain side agreements. Members are also bound by numerous assurances of good faith, as well
as the more general obligation of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.
143. See Third-Party Intervention, supra note 122, at 522-24.
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on the respondent's consent. Article 5 of the Understanding on the Inter-
pretation of Article XXVI mandates submission of a claim of
"substantial interest" to the Member proposing to withdraw the conces-
sion; to the extent that this determination is approval-driven, consent will
apply. Otherwise, consent is irrelevant, and seems too much at odds with
the generally permissive character of intervention under GAIT to deter-
mine status.
Similarly, the type of intervention may have a bearing on the nature of
the intervention permissible, but only in the loosest sense. For example,
there might be valid reason to increase the number of interveners in cases
involving transnational issues, such as services or the environment, or to
limit them where specific trade-linked provisions or developing countries
are involved.
Chinkin's proscriptions are thus restrictive only in the most general
sense and do not establish bright-line criteria for limitation. Concrete
proposals would be more useful. The above review of the ICJ and ECJ
models suggests the following methods of restricting intervention:
1) panels could scrutinize assertions of "substantial interest" more
carefully. In this regard, they could probe the actual reason for
intervention, although this exercise would not be without con-
troversy;
2) panels could also demand, as does the ECJ, that a third party
interest be present and real, as opposed to abstract or
prospective;
3) a further limit could be imposed by means of a formal inter-
pretation of the term "substantial interest" for certain purposes
under WTO Agreement Article IX:2;
4) panels could insist that interveners make arguments in support
of the positions of the party on whose side they intervene so as
to reduce the scope of intervention and diminish its attraction;
5) as mentioned, it may be possible for the DSB to encourage or
mandate more group representation and paper submissions in
order to limit numbers.
Of course, one unwelcome side effect of these suggestions could be to
encourage Members to intervene as principal parties. They would still
have to claim nullification or impairment, or alternately non-violation, but
the current wording and practice of both party and third party status are
very broad, meaning that any reasonable restriction will be hard to imple-
ment. Ultimately, it may be left to the judgment of each WTO member to
exercise restraint in third party practice.
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CONCLUSION
To conclude, it is useful to return to the series of questions posed at
the beginning of this article in order to review the answers that have been
given.
The series began with the central question, namely, what level of in-
terest is necessary to intervene under GATT? The answer is a "substantial
interest," although, as seen, this term has a highly indeterminate quality to
it. Panel reports both before and after the Uruguay Round suggest an
elastic definition. Some level of minimum interest is probably required,
but the reports reveal that this interest may be actual or prospective, trade-
related or abstract, and not necessarily unique to the Member asserting it.
Substantive flexibility has been joined by procedural adaptability, together
corresponding to the wide range of interests now covered by the WTO
Agreement.
Third parties under GATT are presumed to intervene on behalf of the
complainant. However, this has not stopped panels from allowing Mem-
bers to intervene on behalf of respondents when there is the need. The fact
that the rules on this and many other points are wanting has contributed to
the tendency for ad hoc interpretation. Whether this flexibility will be
exhibited by the Appellate Body is uncertain, but the emerging jurispru-
dence suggests that divisions have taken a pragmatic approach to issues
before them.
Panels have imposed some substantive restraint on third parties. For
example, interveners are not allowed to raise new issues or to insist on
procedures where there is a desire to settle. Even in this respect, however,
panels have not been overly rigid. Panels accord third parties considerable
latitude in making submissions, so much so that third parties may have
used their status, on occasion, for purposes collateral to the litigation
itself.
To curb overuse or abusive behavior when necessary, it may be possi-
ble to scrutinize assertions of "substantial interest" more carefully, to
require the interest asserted be present and real, to adopt a restricted
definition of the term "substantial interest," or to encourage or insist on
group representation or paper submissions by third parties. At the same
time, there is no guarantee that these proposals will work. Efforts to rein
in intervention and to prevent abuse will be difficult as the notion of
"substantive interest" becomes more diffuse in the ever-growing ambit of
the WTO. It may not be long before these proposals will be matched by
the ingenuity of legal minds to circumvent them. Tightening up the criteria
for intervention could also have the unwelcomed side effect of forcing
Members to assert interests as parties.
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Yet, the current vogue for active intervention could be short-lived. It is
important to remember that this is a comparatively early time in the
history of the WTO. There is at least the reasonable possibility that some
of the more innovative and aggressive positions which are being taken
under the guise of intervention are being adopted to determine, in a sense,
"how much can be gotten away with." Once the ground rules are set, third
party status may be used relatively less than it is today.
In addition, it may be wise not to make much of the current
"problem" of intervention, if this is indeed an accurate description. As this
article demonstrates, active intervention has long been a feature of GATT.
For interests content with the existing state-centered system, a reason to
keep third party practice as it is currently is that, to the extent national
participation is easily achieved and open-ended, the system may diffuse
pressure for greater public participation in the WTO.
There are also reasons to suggest that multipartite intervention may
not become a problem in future either. One reason is the inability of
Members to show "substantial interest," regardless of how illusory a
standard that might be. Alternately, Members may not want to intervene,
or as it appears from the Bananas Trilogy, may be content to allow other
Members to appear on their behalf. A further pragmatic reason may be
that not all Members have the resources to intervene. Even the redoubtable
Office of the United States' Trade Representative has recently stated that it
is unable to pursue every trade-related matter in which the U.S. has an
interest due to lack of resources. TM
Thus, the argument that the WTO resolution system will collapse as a
result of vigorous third party participation must be repudiated. The Ba-
nanas Trilogy is not the first, nor in all likelihood will it be the last time
that multiple intervention will occur. There is every indication that WTO
dispute resolution is becoming truly multilateralized, thereby fulfilling its
original conception. This development should ensure that future possibili-
ties for third party participation remain of substantial interest.
144. "Terry Stewart, managing partner at the law firm Stewart and Stewart ... argued that
the limited resources of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative make large-scale use of
WTO dispute settlement problematic .... Senior USTR officials have informally said in recent
months that personnel shortages have made it impossible to pursue the WTO cases they want to
pursue." See Official Sees WTO Case Load Leading to Bilateral, Regional Solutions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 10, 1997, at 8.
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POSTSCRIPT
The panel released its report in Bananas III on May 22, 1997. 4' The
report contained a section specifically devoted to the organizational issue
of third party participation in the case, evidence that the issue was impor-
tant to the panel.
In brief, the panel referred both to the mandatory language of DSU
Article 10 ("shall have the opportunity to be heard.. ."), paragraph 6 of
Appendix 3 (shall be invited "to present their views ... [and] may be
present during the entirety of the session") and the fact that under GA'T
practice, more expansive rights were granted to third parties in several
disputes, as support for greater third party rights in Bananas III.' How-
ever, it also noted that under previous cases the extension of third party
rights had been agreed to between the parties. There was no similar
agreement in Bananas III.
In reviewing its interim decision to allow fuller third party participa-
tion, the panel observed that its initial ruling had been based on
considerations of i) the economic effect of the disputed banana regime on
third parties, ii) the fact that the economic benefits derived from Lom6 IV,
an international treaty, iii) past practice, and iv) the failure of the parties to
agree on the question. 47 It is interesting that the panel apparently deviated
from international law and practice by interpreting the lack of consensus
in favor of greater participation, rather than against, as a strict interpreta-
tion of the will of the parties would imply. This is in sharp distinction to
practice in the ICJ, where, as seen, the power of the parties to impose
limits on the Court's adjudication is great. Nevertheless, the panel re-
minded its audience that third party rights are not completely unrestrained
by denying the request of several third parties to participate in the interim
review process, except to allow them to review a draft of their arguments.
In so doing the panel relied on the language of DSU Article 15, which
deals with interim review and "refers only to parties as participants in that
process.'48
145. This postscript refers to Bananas III, supra note 3, Complaint by United States. Three
other decisions, dealing with the complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico,
were released simultaneously. However, the most extensive discussion of third party participa-
tion is contained in the complaint by the United States.
146. See id. para. 7.5.
147. See id para. 7.8.
148. See id para. 7.9.
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